The standing of state-controlled entities under the ICSID Convention: Two key considerations by Feldman, Mark
 
Columbia FDI Perspectives 
Perspectives on topical foreign direct investment issues by 
the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment 
No. 65   April 16, 2012 
Editor-in-Chief: Karl P. Sauvant (Karl.Sauvant@law.columbia.edu) 
Managing Editor: Jennifer Reimer (jreimer01@gmail.com) 
 
 
The standing of state-controlled entities under the ICSID Convention: 




The ICSID Convention, under Article 25(1), applies only to those investment disputes 
that are between a contracting state and a “national” of another contracting state. Given 
that limitation, and in light of the significant and growing amount of foreign investment 
by state-controlled entities (SCEs), 1  ICSID tribunals likely will need to address one 
fundamental issue with greater frequency: whether disputes arising from SCE 
investments constitute investor-state disputes falling within, or state-to-state disputes 
falling outside of, the scope of the ICSID Convention.2 
 
For claims submitted to ICSID arbitration by SCEs, arbitral tribunals consistently have 
found that such entities meet the “national” requirement under Article 25(1), often 
without analysis of how investor-state and state-to-state disputes should be distinguished 
under the provision.3 
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One tribunal, however, has addressed that distinction. In the CSOB v. The Slovak 
Republic case, the tribunal first observed that Article 25(2) defines “National of another 
Contracting State” to include both “natural” and “juridical” persons, but that neither of 
those terms is “defined as such in the Convention.”4 The tribunal then turned to “the 
accepted test” -- formulated by Aron Broches -- for analyzing the “national” requirement 
with respect to a “mixed economy company or government-owned corporation”: whether 
the entity acts as an agent for the government or discharges an essentially governmental 
function.5 
 
Applying that test, the CSOB tribunal concluded that, so long as a state-controlled 
claimant’s activities are commercial in nature, the claim does not give rise to a state-to-
state dispute, even if the claimant’s activities are “driven by” governmental policies and 
even if the entity is controlled by the state such that it is “required” to do the state’s 
“bidding.”6 According to the CSOB tribunal, the purpose -- as distinguished from the 
nature -- of a state-controlled claimant’s activities is not relevant when determining 
whether the claimant meets the “national” requirement under Article 25(1).7 
 
That finding is in tension with two key aspects of the ICSID Convention. First, the ICSID 
Convention was intended to apply to private, but not public, foreign investment. Second, 
the ICSID Convention was intended to respond to a procedural gap that existed between 
state-to-state disputes (which could be resolved in, among other fora, the International 
Court of Justice), and disputes between private entities (which could be resolved through 
domestic courts or commercial arbitration).8 Each of those factors supports consideration 
of not only the nature, but also the purpose, of a state-controlled claimant’s activities 
when determining whether the claimant meets Article 25(1) requirements. 
 
First, regarding private foreign investment, the World Bank had considered, prior to the 
adoption of the ICSID Convention, how to contribute to the investment climate in light of 
the quantitative and qualitative importance of private foreign investment for 
development. 9  That contribution ultimately took the form of the ICSID Convention, 
which opens by recognizing “the need for international cooperation for economic 
development, and the role of private international investment therein....” Consistent with 
that preambular clause, “States acting as investors have no access to the Centre in that 
capacity.”10 
 
Second, regarding the ICSID Convention’s role in addressing a procedural gap between 
state-to-state and purely private disputes, “there was general agreement” from the outset 
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of ICSID Convention negotiations that state-to-state, as well as purely private, disputes 
should be excluded from ICSID jurisdiction.11 That exclusion is reflected not only in 
Article 25(1), but also Article 27, which prohibits diplomatic protection and thus denies 
the investor’s state of nationality access to the Centre.12 In addition, a proposal by “a 
number of governments” to create a limited exception to the state-to-state exclusion -- 
which would have permitted contracting states to submit subrogation claims to ICSID 
arbitration -- faced “vigorous” opposition and ultimately “was dropped.”13 
 
Given the above two factors, the motivations driving the activities of a state-controlled 
claimant should be considered under Article 25(1). A failure to consider such motivations 
risks sweeping into ICSID arbitration public foreign investment disputes between states, 
which would exceed clear ICSID Convention boundaries. 
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